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High income earners and whites get more from voting than
low income earners and African Americans.
In all democratic societies, the public are encouraged to vote in order to have
a say in how their government is run. But do all votes count equally? Looking
at how representatives vote, and if this represents the preferences of their
constituents, John Griff in and Brian Newman find that high income earners
and whites have far greater levels of ‘voting power’ than low income earners
and African Americans. Since incumbents have little incentive to appeal to non-
voters and those who have little voting power, the authors find that African
Americans who vote are no better off than African Americans who don’t. If
citizens increasingly perceive these inequalities, then this may be a further
disincentive for them to vote, leading to questions of democratic legitimacy.
The American polit ical scientist Walter Dean Burnham once argued “if  you don’t vote, you
don’t count.”  It ’s true—voters tend to be better represented polit ically than nonvoters (in
the sense that elected of f icials more of ten pursue voters’ pref erred policies).  What is less
obvious is that the rewards of  voting are unequal.  The incentives f acing elected of f icials in
the U.S. push those of f icials to reward the votes of  high income earners and whites more
than the votes of  low income earners and Af rican Americans.  For some, even if  you vote,
you still don’t count much.
The recent ‘occupy’ movement had at least one thing right—the social science record shows
that wealthy Americans are more likely than the less wealthy to get what they want f rom
government (see, e.g., Gilens, Bartels, Hacker and Pierson, and Page).  White Americans are
also better represented than Af rican Americans  and Latinos.  Figure 1 summarizes this
research.  It shows various groups’ average “win ratios,” or the percentage of  roll call votes
cast in the U.S. House of
Representatives in which a cit izen’s
representative voted the way the
cit izen pref erred (f or the statistically minded, we include 95% conf idence intervals).  By this measure of
representation, it is clear that whites enjoy more polit ical victories than Af rican Americans and victories
increase with income (we split the public into three income groups of  roughly equal size).
Figure 1: Voters’ “win ratios” and Unequal Policy Representation in the U.S.
Data: 2004 National Annenberg Elect ion Survey
Note: Brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 1 also shows that voters win more of ten than do non-voters.  However, elected of f icials have
incentives to reward some voters more than others.  Incumbents know that if  they act inconsistent with
their constituents’ wishes, voting constituents may punish them on election day.  But, not every constituent
has the same power to punish or reward because some voters have more inf luence on the next election’s
outcome.  Specif ically, ‘swing voters,’ those who could be persuaded to vote f or or against the incumbent,
receive disproportionate attention f rom calculating polit icians.  These voters are especially important to
incumbents because swing voters who are not won over will likely vote f or the opponent, while the
dissatisf ied among the base will probably just stay home.  Finally, all else equal, incumbents have an
incentive to appeal to larger groups of  likely voters (usually whites and those earning at least moderate
incomes).
Borrowing a concept f rom Larry Bartels (see chapter 3) and data f rom the 2004 National Annenberg
Election Survey we calculated each cit izen’s “voting power,” based on their probability of  turning out to
vote, the extent to which they are a swing voter, and the size of  their racial/minority or income group in their
congressional district.  Those with higher voting power will be more important to an incumbent’s reelection
ef f ort.  Figure 2 shows the disparity among groups’ average voting power.  Although the raw numbers don’t
have a meaningf ul metric, the f igure makes clear that whites have more voting power, mostly because over
90 per cent of  Af rican Americans tend to vote f or Democratic candidates (i.e. they are not swing voters).  In
addition, middle and high income earners have more voting power, partly because low income earners are a
bit more reliably Democratic than the others and partly because middle and high income earners vote at
modestly higher rates.
Figure 2: Average Voting Power for Groups
Data: 2004 National Annenberg Elect ion Survey
Figure 2 has bold implications: most congressional incumbents in the U.S. have incentives to dole out
whatever resources they have, including their roll call votes, disproportionately to whites and middle and
high income earners.  In f act, using roll call data f rom the 109th Congress (2005-2007) we f ound that those
with higher voting power tend to be better represented.  Cit izens at the 75th percentile of  voting power had
a ‘win ratio’ about 5 points higher than cit izens at the 25th percentile.
Figure 2 also holds a more subtle implication: among groups whose votes are less valued (i.e., low income
earners and Af rican Americans), the ‘rewards of  voting’ are smaller.  This is because incumbents have litt le
incentive to appeal to nonvoters, regardless of  their demographic group.  They also have limited incentive
to appeal to groups with litt le voting power, but strong incentive to appeal to voters in high voting power
groups.  This means we should expect a big gap in the treatment of  voters and non-voters in high voting
power groups, but not much of  a gap f or low voting power groups.
Figure 3: Differences in Win Ratios of Voters and Non-Voters
Data: 2004 National Annenberg Elect ion Survey
This is precisely what we f ind in Figure 3, which shows the dif f erence in the mean ‘win ratio’ of  voters and
non-voters in the groups we study.  On average, white voters enjoy win ratios about 3 points higher than
white non-voters, while Latino voters have win ratios about 4 points higher than Latino non-voters.  In stark
contrast, Af rican Americans who vote are no better of f  than Af rican Americans who do not vote.  In terms
of  income groups, low income voters are slightly better of f  than low income non-voters, with win ratios
about 2 points higher.  In contrast, voters among the middle- income group enjoy win ratios about 8.5 points
higher than non-voters.  For the high income group, the dif f erence is 10 points.  As a point of  comparison,
we f ound that, on average, a Republican constituent with a Republican member of  the House has a win
ratio 15 points higher than a Republican represented by a Democrat in the House.  Thus, the ‘rewards of
voting’ f or middle and high income earners is over half  as large as the ef f ect of  being able to choose the
party of  one’s representative.
Note that our f indings do not imply that government of f icials are racist or classist (consciously or
subconsciously).  Although some may be, the electoral incentives f acing incumbent of f icials push them to
act in ways that advantage whites and the wealthy.  Simply replacing current incumbents with a f resh batch
of  more enlightened representatives will make litt le dif f erence unless underlying patterns of  party voting
and levels of  polit ical activity shif t.
Not only are polit ical inequalit ies apparently persistent, they may increase in the f uture.  Voters may sense
the inequalit ies in who elected of f icials represent and the unequal rewards of  voting.  Cit izens who f eel that
the system doesn’t work f or them and that voting provides f ew rewards may decide not to vote.  Preliminary
evidence suggests that Af rican Americans and low income earners do sense their limited rewards f rom
voting.  If  a sizeable portion of  polit ically active Af rican Americans and low income earners drop out of
polit ics altogether, not only will their groups lose even more voting power, the democratic system may lose
some of  its legit imacy.  Moreover, turning out the vote has long been a chief  strategy f or disadvantaged
groups to gain polit ical power.  If  voting brings f ew rewards to groups with limited voting power, mobilization
ef f orts may provide only a limited avenue f or these groups to level the degree of  polit ical clout among the
American public.
At this point, we have not seen evidence suggesting that these inequalit ies will inevitably increase. 
Conditions can change.  In 2008 and 2012, f or the f irst t ime Af rican Americans voted at higher rates than
whites, meaning Af rican Americans’ voting power is on the rise relative to whites.  Groups currently
beholden to one party might become more persuadable and thus increase their voting power.  Although it is
hard to imagine many Af rican Americans def ecting to the Republican Party, it is a rare day that the American
media does not discuss the Republicans’ ef f orts to woo Latino voters away f rom the Democratic f old.  The
patterns we see here are not immutable.  However, the electoral logic behind them seems quite stable and
may generate f urther polit ical inequalit ies f ar into the f uture.
This article is based on the paper “Voting Power, Policy Representation, and Disparit ies in Voting’s
Rewards”in the January 2013 edition of the Journal of Politics.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USApp– American Politics and Policy,
nor of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit .ly/184ToVp
_________________________________________
About the authors
John D. Griff in –  University of Colorado Boulder
John D. Grif f in is Associate Prof essor of  Polit ical Science at the University of  Colorado,
Boulder. He specializes in the study of  polit ical equality within American polit ical institutions,
especially the U.S. Congress. He is the co-author (with Brian Newman) of  Minority Report:
Evaluating Polit ical Equality in America (University of  Chicago Press). He is currently writ ing a
book with John Aldrich on the f ailure of  representation in the American South, also f or
Chicago.
Brian Newman -  Pepperdine University
Brian Newman is Associate Prof essor of  Polit ical Science at Pepperdine University in Malibu,
Calif ornia.  He studies who gets what they want f rom government, when and why presidents
are popular, and religion’s ef f ects on polit ics in the U.S.  He is author, along with John
Grif f in, of  Minority Report: Evaluating Political Equality in America (University of  Chicago
Press), an examination of  the degree to which elected of f icials act in concert with the
wishes of  Af rican Americans, Latinos, and whites.
CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 2014 LSE USAPP
